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Abstract
The severe environmental disasters resulting from
certain tanker-accidents in the past fifteen years has
been the impetus for both a national and international
reappraisal of existing safety standards.
In March 1977, the United States began to press for
a speedy adoption of stricter tanker safety and pollution
requirements while placing renewed emphasis on the formulation of mandatory, global crew training standards and
certification criteria, due in part to the worldwide
acknowledgement that over eighty percent of vessel accidents
were caused by "human error".
With the signing of the International Convention on
Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping Bor
Seafarers, the United States addressed the major impacts
of the new Convention requirements during Congressional hearings leading to the passage of the Maritime Education and
Training Act of 1980, which revamped existing legislation
into one significant act while clarifying and recodifying
Federal, state and union relationships in the area of merchant marine training.
This paper examines the major details of the STCW
Convention and the Maritime Education Act and their interrelationships to the American Merchant Marine training
pipeline.

The various programs which provide entry-level,

selected advanced, continuing education and refresher training for our tanker personnel are discussed.

The educational

value and current status of the utilization of shore-based

simulators for "equiva.;Lency training" is examined in light
of the increased sea training requirements presented in the
STCW Convention.

The inherent benefit of a well-balanced mix

of simulator training and at-sea experience for the safe,
profossional operation of our Merchant Marine by the "human
element" is stressed.
Finally, the total training concept is discussed vrith
emphasis on improved bridge management, sound passage planning and effective vayage training to further upgrade tanker
vessel safety.
World Trends
In the past decade, the world's industrialized nation's
dependence on imported crude oil and upon increasingly large
capacity tankers to carry this cargo, has been aptly demonstrated.

To transport the world's petroleum needs, the major

shipping companies have shifted their efforts toward more
economically efficient carriage.

With somewhere between 100

and 200 million tons of oil at sea at any particular time,
the world tanker fleet is now represented by approximately
one-half of its vessels in the Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC)
category (greater than two hundred thousand deadweight tons
(200K DWT)).l

This represents the most economical method of

sea transport per ton of oil carried as chartering, operating
and capital costs are a fraction of what they would be for
much smaller (15 to 20K DWT) vessels.

It would appear at

first glance that an overall reduction in the number of tankers through introduction of newer, larger oil carriers would
prove to be beneficial regarding safety standards at sea.
2

Certainly the fact that sea lanes might be less congested,
more highly sophisticated equipment for navigation purposes
is employed, and the most modern technological innovations
are available, has not lessened either .t.he number of ships
lost yearly nor the environmental disasters resulting from
tanker accidents such as the Argo Merchant and Amoco Cadiz.
In the past few years there has been a continuing upward
trend in the number of ships lost and the number lost yearly
as a percentage of the total world fleet.

According to Lloyd's

Register of Shipping Information services, in 1979 about .5%
of the total world's tonnage was lost due to accidents.
Additionally, for the second straight year the number of ship
losses exceeded 400, a 15 to 20 percent increase over the
years 1974-1977. 2 The following chart depicts the upward
trend in tonnage lost yearly and the tonnage lost as a percentage of 'the total world fleet at risk.
Annual Record of Tonnage Totally Lost:
World Fleet
At Risk

1974-1979 3

Total Losses
Ton %
World Fleet

No.

GRT

1974

61,194

311,322,626

311

869,658

0.28

1975

63,724

342,162,363

336

995,621

0.29

1976

65,887

371,999,9 26

345

1, 156, 109

0.31

1977

67,945

393,678,369

336

1,073,127

0.27

1978

69,020

406,001,979

473

1,710,813

0.42

1979

71,129

413,021,426

400

2,304,000

0.49 *

liQ..

GRT

* Provisional figures for 1979 losses, final figures higher.
Accident rates for VLCC's are lower than smaller ships
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according to data prepared by the United Kingdom Tanker Safety
Group~

This data was accepted by the Maritime Safety Com-

mittee of the Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO) for interpretation and computation of their
accident statistics. 4

It is important to recognize that

greater than 40% of the world's fleet and over 60% of United
States flag vessels are represented by tanker tonnage. 5
Regardless off the statistics, the severe results of
tanker accidents have been the impetus both in the United
States and internationally to enforce tighter shipping standards.

The grounding and sUbsequent sinking of the

~

Merchant near the coast of New England in the \nnter of 1976-

1977, together with a dozen other major tanker pollution and
safety-related incidents, forced a reassessment of the entire
tanker safety situation here.

Likewise, the Torrey Canyon

disaster of 1967 led to the formation of IMCO's Maritime
Safety Committee which has the duty of considering shipboard
navigation and safety matters and proposing changes or recommending action.
U,S, Trends

The United States began to work in early 1977 on unilateral actions to enhance tanker safety while pressing for the
adoption of stronger safety and pollution control and prevention initiatives at the international level through the
IMCO forum.

During this period in a message to Congress,

President Carter proposed tanker vessel improvements in the
areas of crew training standards, vessel certification and
inspection criteria and vessel equipment and construction
standards,

Internationally, these concepts have been the

4

subject of conferences and subsequent conventions or protocols.
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), 1978, addresses minimum training requirements for all maritime nations.
The 1978 Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and 1978 Marine Pollution (MARPOL) Protocols address specifically improved vessel
inspection and certification procedures along with construction
and equipment improvements.

Among these are radar requirements

(larger ships must carry two which operate independently),
installation of two remote steering systems, two or more individual power units for main steering gear (each capable of
rudder control) and more frequent inspections and annual
surveys for ships.
National initiatives for tanker safety improvements began
immediately under the cognizance of the Coast Guard through
promulgation of Tanker Safety Regulations.

Although the

Coast Guard was given power under the 1972 Ports and Waterways
Safety Act to propose its own regulations independently of
international treaty, the Coast Guard position was to wait
for additional international agreements before acting.

Thus

the institution of unilateral, more stringent measures did
not occur until the post-Argo Merchant time frame.

These

included institution of a stepped-up Vessel Inspection program
which required foreign flag vessels entering our ports to submit to structural checks and examination of firefighting and
cargo handling equipment.

Regulations for navigation equip-

ment improvements for ships over 1600 tons entering United
States' waters were issued in mid-1977, including the authority to ban ships from entry or delay departures if problems

5

were of sufficient severity.

Use of the Marine Safety

Information System (MRIS) assists the Coast Guard in identifying ships who have been violators of safety regulations
by providing a historical, computerized print out for individual vessels.

Many of the aforementioned regulations were

the foundation for the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 in
which the United States took unilateral action to achieve
better safety and environmental protection for our nearshore and inland waters.

STew

Impacts
The international initiative which may very well have

the greatest impact in the arena of safety is the
ention.

S~CW

Conv-

In the early 70's, a subcommittee of IMCO's Maritime

Safety Committee was established to study the problem because
"in vd.ew of the continuing alarming rise in maritime casualties and pollution, it is necessary for urgent action to be
taken, aimed at strengthening and improving standards and
professional qualifications of seafarers as a means of securing better guaranties of safety at sea and protection of the
marine environment".6

The STCW Convention represents a unique

approach to the safety problem in that an acceptable minimum
level of training is proposed vice the highest possible standards.

It is clearly recognized that many nations will al-

ready have or be striving toward higher standards.

Approach-

ing improved safety from this vantage point appears very important from what we have learned from vessel accidents.
Unfortunately, we have seen that not only substandard vessels
go aground or have major accidents.

6

Vessels, particularly

tankers, will only perform in a safe, efficient manner if
the master and crew are competent, familiar with their ships'
capabilities and well-trained, especially in emergency procedures.

It also appears that it is a rare casualty which

results from equipment malfunction or failure.

The human

factor has played a significant role in almost every report
of tanker collision, grounding or other major accident.
Shortly after the STCW conference the Secretary-General of
IMCO emphasized the problem.

"It is a major step forward

towards ensuring maritime safety, particularly the safety
of navigation and protection of the environment, because it
has been recognized that over 80% of marine accidents are
caused by human errors."?
A number of Congressional hearings were convened by the
U.S. House of Representatives Merchant Marine Committee prior
to the final drafting of these international maritime conventions.

During this period a massive reexamination of inter-

national and national maritime safety regulations was progressing; initiated in the international sphere by IMCO with the
pervasive support of the United States and on the domestic
scene through intensified monitoring of vessels by the Coast
Guard.

Stricter navigational vessel construction and inspec-

tion regulations were formulated and eventually codified in
the Port and Tanker Safety Act.

As these measures were

tightened, more emphasis began to emerge in the complex arena
of our nation's maritime policies concerning formal schooling
and retraining for our seafarers.

In related safety hearings

before the Subcommittee on the Merchant Marine, John H. Leeper,
Senior Project Manager for the National Maritime Transportation

?

Board of the National Research Council/National Academy of
Sciences testified on a study completed by the Board entitled
"Human Error in Merchant Marine Safety".

This was one of the

first instances in which the man-machine relationship, at sea
stresses affecting the seaman and the impact of sound training policies at all levels were presented to Congress.
of the findings of the Board were rather startling.

Some

Although

the United States was considered among the world's leaders
in merchant marlne safety, Lloyd's Register of Shipping reported that in 1973 the U.S. lost.21% of active tonnage through
merchant marine casualty.

This placed behind countries such

as Great Britain, Sweden, USSR, Poland France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway and Japan in safety performance.

Addit-

ionally, Lloyd's reported that the largest number of vessel
losses were by groundings, collisions, fires, and founderings,
all of which involve human judgments. 8 Lending further
credence to the argument that the human factor is a predominant cause of merchant marine casualties was the report in
1972 by the American Hull Insurance Syndicate that 85% of its
claims were for casualties caused by human error; additionally,
in

fisca~

year 1974, Coast Guard statistics showed that only

15% of the vessels involved in casualties reported material or
mechanical malfunctions as the principal cause of the incident. 9
The survey grouped the findings into many a.reas which
tended to adversely affect human,performance at sea.

Among

the most important cited were fatigue, physical fitness,
alcohol use, emotional stability, personnel turnover and operational discipline.

The survey consisted of a questionaire

\uth deta.iled responses and

follow~on

8

interviews with 359

• dOa va,
i.duaI s , 10
In

The survey was instrumental in directing Congressional
effort into the area of training and certification revisions
for our seafarers.

A comparison between the levels of safety

inherent in air versus sea transporta.tion reveals radical
differences as stated in Mr. Leeper's concluding remarks:
"The conditions revealed in the survey have not been allowed
to exist in air transportation, yet the potential for destruction is as great 1hf not greater in the merchant marine."ll
Some of the recommendations voiced by Mr. Leeper formed a
baseline for further study and legislation by the United States
to advance existing training standards and certification
policies.
The task of upgrading the safety performance of
merchant marine personnel vall require a dedicated
effort throughout the maritime community. IncreaBed physical and mental standards can be enforced
through required physical examinations. Problems
in operational discipline and lack of vessel familiarization can be treated through improved training and
the use of dynamic testing in the issuance and
renewal of licenses.
No officer should be allowed to stand a deck or
engine watch on a ship unless he has had previous
experience or special training on that type of ship •••
In the years of the 1980's maritime transportation
,will~havearuenormous impact~gn the energy. aBd .
environmental concerns of both this country and the
world. Not only \rill ships transport vast quanti ties 0 f the wo r-L d' s resources but they will carry
vdth them a continuing potential for creating death,
destruction, and pollution on a scale unmatched
by and other mode of transportation. This condi~
tion represents a grave challenge not only for the
maritime community but for the Nation as a whole. 12
The STCW Convention contains seventeen articles dealing
vdth issuance of certificates to seafarers, provisions to
cover the transition from state procedures to Convention procedures, educational and training equivalents,to seagoing
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experience, detainment or delay procedures for ships found
posing a significant danger through non-compliance with the
Convention, promotion of technical cooperation, amendment
procedures and final clauses.

The technical provisions of

the Convention are included in an Annex containing six chapters.

These provisions deal with mandatory minimum require-

ments for shipboard deck, engineering and radio departments.
Basic procedures for maintaining required navigational watches,
certification of masters, chief mates and officers-in-charge
of ships are delineated.

Certification for other watchstanders

and continuing proficiency requirements are discussed.
Certification requirements for engineering officers are
prescribed in another chapter and are defined in accordance
with shipboard power generation capabilities.

Watchstanding

provisions are outlined for both conventionally-manned and
more automated engine room facilities.

Training continuum

procedures for engineers are established.
The radio department is similarly discussed in terms of
watchstanders' competency and required technical expertise to
perform maintenance.

Minimum essential qualifications for

radiotelephone operators are described together with procedures to ensure updating of knowledge.
In an important chapter which was developed by the
Subcommittee at the STCW Conference during June-July 1978,
minimum standards for tank vessel personnel are discussed.
Training and

qualification~of masters,

officers and ratings

requirecompletion of fire fighting courses, oil tanker familiarization training, cargo handling equipment and hazards
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training, operational sequencing and oil tanker terminology.
This chapter prescribes further training for more senior
tanker personnel and for those charged with the responsibility
for "loading, discharging and care in transit or handling of
cargo l l • 13 According to the Convention these additional prerequtsites are:
(a) relevant experience appropriate to their duties
on oil tankers; and
(b) ''"".completed -, a '-specialized training programme
appropriate to their duties, including oil tanker
safety, fire safety measures and systems, pollution
prevention and control, operational practice and 14
obligations under applicable laws and regulations.
Other important provisions of this chapter are minimum requirements for training and qualification of personnel manning
chemical and liquified natural gas (LNG) tankers.

The final

chapter to the Annex deals with proficiency for certification
in various survival craft.
The Convention will enter into force one year after
acceptance by 25 nations owning among them 50% of the world's
gross tonnage.

As of December 1980, the Convention had been

ratified by seven countries with
tonnage.

37% of the world's gross

Additionally, the STCW Convention utilizes the "tacit

acceptance" principle for amendments.

Amendments will be

considered accepted two years after introduction unless onethird of the parties to the Convention owning among them 50%
of the world's merchant ship gross tonnage object.

This pro-

cedure has been found to accelerate the amendment process.
VJhat then will be the effect of this Convention on the
United States?

Have the standards for training and certif-

ication been set too low?
report: -..a.nd·.:-c.Qn:t·r.o1

0

Is the established procedure for

f violations strong enough?
11

Most

importantly, how will the individual nations institute the
necessary training and control processes to raise their
standards where necessary?

These questions and many others

concerning the STCW Convention have been debated.

As prev-

iously noted, the standards are established internationally
for the first time and although many of the highly industrialized shipping nations of the world already have in place
more restrictive regul.ations, these minimum standards presently appear to be the best compromise situation.

Despite

the fact that some feel the standards were not set high
enough, the Convention will undoubtedly have a positive
effect on less-developed nations' merchant fleets and" flag
of convenience" shipping, while standards comparable to those
cited in the Convention are implemented as the date of entry
into force draws closer.

In the past few years, flag of

convend.enc e ovmers have seen this "handwriting on the wall"
and in order to protect the:i:r lucrative business ventures
have begun to channel more of their profits into improving
previous low standards.

Any qualitative improvement in world

shipping should have a positive effect on the daily ingress
of tankers at United States' ports.
The Convention has, also for the first time, set generalized international guidelines for the reporting of vd.o l ations of the Convention.

Requirements for detention of the

violator are extremely limited, and in any case, where delay
of departure is enforced, the ship is due compensation for
time lost.

The United States has stricter unilateral

procedures in place for tankers entering our waters, i.e.,
the aforementioned Port and Tanker Safety Act.
12

The inter-

national procedures of STCW should also have a positive
effect on improved tanker safety.

A very important point is

that they postulate means for documentation of deficiencies
in an international context which, heretofore had not existed.
The implementation of improved training standa.rds by
certain nations or the continued upgrading of maritime education and training by nations such as the United States, is
8.

most pressing task.

The utilization of refresher courses

required at regular intervals, ensuring that those returning
to sea duty are thoroughly indoctrinated in the required
curricula for

the~r

certificates, the use of navigation and

engineering simulators during regular, superYised training
periods are among the tasks that will lead to comprehensive,
positive improvements in the professionalism of our seafarers.
National Legislation
As previously stated, the coming into force of the STCW
Convention should have positive benefits for the United States.
The U.S. pushed for more sophisticated international standards
and it was at our insistence that the STCW conference was
convened during the summer of 1978 vice later in the year.
The current U.S. standards for certification and training
exceed Convention goals in almost every instance.

Although

some modifications to our existing training programs vall be
required, the provisions for "equivalent" training and the
five year transitional period after the Convention's entry
into force will permit the required orderly adjustments.
These educational and training standards are a result of policies which have been evolving since the establislunent of the

13

u.s.

Merchant Marine and are contained in numerous

nation8~

legislative acts and in the programs of our maritime academies
and schools.

Our nation's maritime education and training

curricula are more closely related to the human performance
factor in tanker safety than all the high technology and
automation factors in shipping today.

An examination of

entry-level training, specialized schooling and refresher and
on-the-job training, as well as national legislation dealing
with maritime education and training affecting the safe,
competent and professional performance of our merchant marine
is therefore warranted.
The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 contains in a broad
context the pOlicy which fosters Federal participation in the
training and education of our nation's seafarers.

Under

Table I, Section 101 of the Act, it is stated that:
It is necessary for the national defense and development of its foreign and domestic commerce that
the United States shall have a merchant marine •••
composed of the best-equipped, safest, and most
suitable types of vessels, constructed in the United
States and manned
a trained and efficient
citizen personnel •••

wif§

Section 216 of the Act provides for the Secretary of Commerce
to maintain the United States Nerchant Marine Academy (USMMA)
for the preparation of officers to serve in the merchant marine
as

a third assistant engineer and/or third mate.

Congress

felt the need for additional legislation to support the training of maritime personnel and in 1940 passed the Civilian
Nautical School Act, providing funding to schools other than
state or Federal maritime academies who offered shipboard-based
instructmon for the purpose of training for merchant marine
duty.

The 85th Congress passed the Maritime Academy Act of 1958
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vdth the purpose of assisting the states in the maintenance
and operation of maritime academies for the education of
future merchant marine officers.

This act encouraged the

idea of partnership between the states and the Federal government in not only providing a wealth of skilled, professional
merchant officers but emphasized the training of Nava.l Science
at the state level so that these personnel could serve competently to further enhance the capability of the merchant
marine in time of war or national emergency.
Commencing in the mid-1970's, Congress desired to pull
together the myriad collection 0 f legislation dealing with
maritime education and training into one significant act
which would clarify and recodify the Federal-state-mari time
union relationship.

The task was assigned to a special sub-

committee of the House Committee on the Herchant Marin:e/Fisne%'ies.
The Ad Hoc Select Subcommittee on Haritime Education and
Training, initially under the chairmanship of Representative
Studds and later Representative AuCoin, helld hearings during
the 95th and 96th Congresses.

Thsir labors resulted in the

signing on October 15, 1980 of the Maritime Education and
Training Act of 1980, the most comprehensive bill concerning
education and training of merchant marine personnel.

As

stated in the final report of the activities of the House
Merchant Harine and Fisheries Committee, 96th Congress, the
Act will:
recodify the existing provlslons of law concerning
maritime education and training that are currently
set forth in the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, the
Haritime Academy Act ,0-f1958, the Civilian Nautical
School Act, and the numerous other provisions of
law scattered throughout Title 46 of the United
States Code. Additionally, the above recodif:Led
15

statutes have been amended to implement the
recommendations of the Studds committee. Most
ot t h.e amendments pertain to the operations of
the U.S. ~1erchant Marine Academy at Kings Point,
N.Y. and the six State maritime academies or
colleges located in Maine, Massachusetts, New York,
California, Texas, and Michigan. As so amended,
the recodified statutes are set forth as a new
title, Tt61e XIII, in the Merchant Marine Act
of 1936.
'I'he primary provisions of the Act are:

(1)

a five year service obligation for graduates of the USMMA.

Active duty Naval service vrith enlisted status is the alternative to completion of merchant marine service.
(2)

prohibition against training foreign nationals except as

specifically authorized in other legislation.

(3)

authorized Federal support to regional academies.

(4)

Federal student incentive payments are authorized in a

"fair and equi tabl e manner".

(5)

authorizes the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to provide

cadet training (comparable to USMMA at sea training) at sea
aboard commercial ships.

(6)

Secretary of the Navy may appoint state maritime school

students as midshipmen in the U.S. Naval Reserve.

(7)

state academy graduates who receive Federal support will

incur a three year service obligation.

(8)

incorporation of the Civilian Nautical School Act with

basically no changes.

(9)

continuation of supplementary training currently pro-

vri de d by MARAD.

(10)

authority to provide surplus marine equipment to appro-

ved maritime training schools.
In a report issued during Ad Hoc Subcommittee hearings,

16

another rationale for passage of the Maritime Education and
Training Act can be found:
(the Act) provides even-handed Federal support
of Federal and State maritime academies so that
current and projected shortages of merchant
marine officers for U.S. flag vessels can be
accomodated as efficiently as Dossible ••• \nll
ensure that graduates go to se~. 17
There exists various means for an individual to complete
the required training and qualify as a merchant marine officer.
The four primary suppliers of officers are the USMMA, the six
state operated maritime academies or colleges, the Marine
Engineers Beneficial Association Calhoon school and the
"Hawsepipe", in which unlicensed seamen obtain the prerequisite training through experience and on-the-job training,
take the examination for third assistant engineer or third
mate and receive their initial license as a merchant marine
officer.

Before taking the written exam, candidates must

meet citizenship, age and sea experience requirements.

The

Coast Guard. administers the licensing and certification program, including management of the written exam.

Although the

Coast Guard is intimately involved in vessel safety and crew
certification standards, they do not conduct merchant marine
training per see

The Coast Guard-MARAD relationship in this

area has been succinctly stated by Rear Admiral VI.M. Benkert,
USCG:
Our program does not perform training of merchant
crews. That is ~ statutory responsibility of the
Maritime Administration. We do, however, work
closely ,nth MARAD, through a joint memorandum of
understanding to insure the correct meshing of
crew qualification standards and crew training. 18
The Department of Commerce's Maritime Administrationsponsored education programs:

17

help provide well-trained personnel for the American merchant marine, help coordinate maritime
labor policies with national and international
organizations; provide "hands-on" training to
qualified seafarers'9.and set manning levels for
subsidized vessels.

u.s.

Training Facilities
The

pr~ncipal,

entry-level facility for maritime officers

is the U8MMk, Kings Point, N.Y.

Cadets receive training in all

facets of maritime affairs, engineering and deck seamanship during four years of school leading to a B.S. degree.

One-half of

each cadet's sophomore and junior years are spent at sea aboard

u. S. commercial ships.

The final few weeks

0

f each at sea as-

signment is spent working ashore in a maritime-related occupation
such as a commercial port facility.

To complete graduation elig-

ibility, students must pass all courses and pass the Coast Guard
certification exam for third mate, third assistant engineer, or
in certain cases, dual license qualification which enables the
prospective officer to gain initial employment in either deck
or engineering billets. 20 Additionally, graduates must accept
commissions as Ensigns in the U.S. Naval Reserve if offered.
"Snrollment at the Academy was 1109 for fiscal year 1979, with

253 graduates.

Of these, 95% found employment aboard commercial

vessels or were assigned to duty in the Navy or Coast Guard. 21
MARAD operates five regional radar training centers,
located in New York City, Toledo, New Orleans, Seattle and

San Francisco.

Comprehensive, basic and advanced, theoretical

and practical, radar training in collision avoidance is
offered at each facility for the purpose of reducing accidents
by collision at sea, resulting ,damage to cargo, loss of life

18

and, possibly, massive environmental disaster.

Marine radar

display units such as those found on U.S. flag vessels are
used.

Simulated radar video provides realistic training for:
-,

.

~

qualified merchant mariners, operators of inland
waterway and offshore drilling and mining vessels,
maritime academy students, and personnel of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration,
Coast Guard, Army Corps of Engineers and U.S. Naval,
Reserve. 22
Courses to prepare for radar recertification exams are also
taught.

Courses are offered in the use of the gyrocompass,

automatic direction finding (ADF) equipment, fathometer and
LORAN at these regional centers.

MARAD sponsors fire fighting

indoctrination and refresher training at four regional locations,
utilizing Naval facilities at the Military Sealift Command,
Earle, N.J., and the Naval Technical Training Center, Treasure
Island, CA, and their ovm centers at Toledo and New Orleans.
Expanded use

0

f

these facilities is planned to accomodate the

tighter regulations dictated by recent Coast Guard regulations
and those

Conventions pending ratification which
require specific fire fighting training by tanker personnel .. 23
internationa~

Both classroom and "hands-on" methods are utilized.

Recently-

introduced training includes a special ten week deck elective
course on the Great Lakes, offered at the US1~1A.24 In the
area of continuing education, MARAD offers short marine diesel
engineering training programs of five weeks for active marine
engineers and a one week curriculum for masters, chief mates
and port engineers at Kings Point. 25
There are six State maritime academies training future
officers for our merchant marine.
(1)

They are:

State of New York Maritime College, Fort Schulyer, NY
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(2)

Maine Maritime Academy, Castine, ME

(3)

Texas Maritime College, Galveston, TX

(4)

Massachusetts Maritime Academy, Buzzards Bay, MA

(5)

California Maritime Academy, Vallejo, CA

(6)

Great Lakes Maritime Academy, Traverse City, MI

These state-sponsored maritime colleges provide approximately
six hundred qualified merchant marine officers yearly.

Five

of the six academies award bachelor's degrees to graduates,
while the Great Lakes academy is a three year associate degree
program.

Graduates of the four year" programs may enter the

merchant marine as third mate or third assistant engineer upon
successfully passing the certification exam, while graduates
of the three year program may receive a first class Great Lakes
pilot's license or become a third assistant engineer.

Graduates

of state academies are commissioned as U.S. Naval Reserve
officers if qualified.

According to MARAD, in 1979, 86.5%

0

f

the state graduates were employed afloat or serving on active
duty vdth the Navy or Coast Guard. 26 Numerous additional
maritime education and safety-related training is conducted by
the state colleges such as adult continuing education, special
radar and oil pollution courses (Texas Maritime), short courses
for experienced personnel (Maine Maritime), and a graduate
program for advanced training of marine professionals in such
fields as marine transportation (SUNY Maritime).27

One of the

major differences between the state academies and the USMMA is
the use of training vessels for at sea experience.
US}~A

Vfuile the

trains cadets on commercial vessels, the salt water

state academies use dedicated Federally-owned and academyoperated training ships for cruises.
("r

'

.
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;

.
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The States bear the brunt

of the operating costs for these vessels, including fuel.
The Great Lakes Maritime Academy differs in that their
dents train on Great Lakes' commercial vessels.

stu~

These schools

provide and added, proven flexibility to our input of merchant
marine officers, evidenced by instances of accelerated graduations during the Vietnam era when the nation's maritime
capability was taxed.
Other extremely active participants in the continuing
education of merchant marine officers and seamen are the
maritime unions.

The leading maritime labor-operated school

is the Marine Engineers Beneficial Association (MEBA), Jesse
E.

C8~hoon

Engineering school, one of the major suppliers of

U.S. Merchant Marine officers.

Begun in 1966, MEBA's Calhoon

school offers a three year program leading to accredidation
as a third assistant engineer.

Classroom studies and ship-

board regimen are combined in a three year program.

Students

are required to study electricity, electronics, general maritime studies including fire fighting and first aid, industrial
arts such as welding, marine engineering, mathematics, sciences
and physical education.

Training is managGd in threG phases:

(1) basic classroom studies ashore for six months; (2) demanding training at sea aboard commercial vessels for twelve months;
(3) classroom and simulator training ashore for the final

eighteen months.
annuc.l l.y ,

The MEBA curriculum graduates 590 students

Refresher and advanced training is also provided

to union members by tihis school. 28
Probably the most advanced curriculum for marchent marine
deck officers is offered by the Maritime Institute of Technology
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and Graduate Studies (MITAGS), Linthicum Heights, MD, a
school founded by the International Organization of Masters,
Mates and Pilots (IOMM&P). This post-graduate program is
designed "to enable licensed deck officers to enhance professional skills.,,29 Courses are based on real world problems
and needs Of the deck officer. Extensive utilization of
. simulators to effect rapid, accurate navigational, cargo
handling and hazardous material movement decision-making is
stressed.

Course offerings include Marine Cargo Operations,

Admiralty Law, Ship's Business, All Weather Navigation, Ship's
Control Systems, Gas Carrier Operations and Emergency Medical
Training (EMT).

The school uses a full mission simulator with

all-around vision, day and night simulation and realistic
motion and audio techniques.

Near-future additions include the

current construction of a liquified natural gas (LNG) ship
simulator to train deck officers in handling and transfer
aspects of this specialized cargo carrier.

Concentrated,

advanced training in realistic scenarios for seasoned deck
officers is the inherent philosophy at the MITAGS. 30

Today's

complex systems demand extensive training for continued safe,
reliable sea transportation and cargo delivery.
Entry-level training for unlicensed personnel is provided
at various union-operated and financed schools.

The Harry

Lundeberg School of Seamanship at Piney Point, MD, teaches
the basics of marine education with increased emphasis on the
safety-related aspects of shipboard life. Firefighting
courses are a requirement for attBndees.

Instruction is

given in deck, engineering and steward duties.

Additional

reorientation work and upgrading is available for former
22

seamen returning to duty. 31

Approximately 2300 men and women
graduate from the Lundeberg school each year. 32 The National
Maritime Union Upgrading and Retraining School is another
facility providing entry-level training for the unlicensed
seaman or engineer.

This school trains 345 seafarers annually.33

MEBA District #2 Associated Maritime Officers Union High Seas
School and Great Lakes School train 165 and 140 unlicensed
personnel in steam and diesel engineering fields. 34 Maritime
training in the area of shipboard telecommunications through
both residence training and correspondence courses is offered
by the American Radio Association Technological Institute for
Maritime Electronics aBA-TIME) based in New York City.
technology radio equipment maintenange, :repair.

and

J

High

oper:a.t:ton

is studied by approximately 300 personnel annually.35

At

Easton, MD, the Radio Officers Union (ROU) performs similar
training for prospective shipboard radio officers. 36 Various
other vocational institutes offer additional selective, entrylevel maritime courses around the country.
According to MARAD, many new, safety-related courses of
instruction are being considered for future implementation.
These are Automatic Radar Plotting Aids, Satellite Navigation
systems, OMEGA, and '.: M

advanced fire fighting course with em-

phasis on fire party leadership and management.

Additionally,

a Marine Chemist program ris proposed as an additional safety
requirement for certain types of ships, i.e., chemical and
oil tankers. 37
As the arm of the executive branch tasked with safety
inspections and certification of tankers and their personnel,
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the Coast Guard

~ust

effec·tively train their officer and

enlisted personnel assigned to these duties.

Much of this

schooling is performed at the Marine Safety School (MSS),
Yorktown, VA.

Coast Guard junior officers receive a twelve

week basic indoctrination course in marine safety matters.
A similar, more technical curriculum for enlisted personnel
is the five week Marine Environmental Systems course for petty
officers (MESPOC).

Other entry-level, basic and advanced

courses in maritime safety relating to the U.S. Merchant
Marine are presented.

MSS Yorktown's goal provides the corner-

stone for Coast Guard regulation and certification actions:
n(to) train marine officers and petty officers in the Coast
Guard's commercial vessel safety, marine environmental protection, and ports safety and security programs. n38
Effects of STCW on U.S. Training
As the United States' maritime authorities look to systems
which will further enhance tanker safety, the increased utilization of navigation and engineering simUlators to balance
underway training appears to be one of the most cost effective
methods.

The new IMCO requirements promulgated by the STCW

Convention will force a reappraisal of our current training
methods and cause an increased use of simulators to achieve
required experience.

Under the new rules, one year at sea

experience will be necessary for an individual to qualify for
licensing as a third mate.

Current Coast Guard requirements

call for six months underway training as the prerequisite.
The Convention allows individual nations to make use of equivalent training to supplement at sea training in order to
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achieve the one year goal.

As stated in Article IX of the

STCW Convention:
(1) The Convention shall not prevent an Administration from retaining or adopting other educational and training arrangements, _ including those
invol ving sea-going service and shipboard organization especially adapted to technical developments and to special types of ships and trades,
provided that the level of sea-going service,
knowledge and efficiency as regards navigational
and technical handling 0 f ship and cargo ensures
a degree of safety at sea and has a preventive
effect as regards pollution at least eqyivalent
to the requirements of the Convention.5~
The lengthened requirement for one year seagoing experience
prior to licensing as a third mate will most adversely impact
the State maritime academies.

While the USMMA cadets spend

a minimum of 300 days involved in underway training, the State
schools'norm is now about six months.

The use of navigation

simulators to provide the balance will no doubt be exercised by
the Merchant Marine Academy, however the states will have to
find a blend of additional practical underway experience and
shore-based training periods to satisfy the additional six
month period.

The types of simulators available, how much

simulation time will be accepted for equivalency purposes,
training aboard small vessels as partial fulfillment of the
underway prerequisite and the possible utilization of pierside
training ships to provide some equivalent time is being investigated.

Currently, the Coast Guard is considering a maximum

of three months equivalency time to be fulfilled by simulators. 40
Final regulat±ons will be determined by the Coast Guard in
conjunction with MARAD and the affected educational institutions.
Underway training qualifications for personnel seeking certification as third assistant engineer or Great Lakes duty will
not be affected by the terms of the Convention; only those
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attempting to secure positions as third mate need the additional sea training or equivalency certification.

As prev-

iously mentioned, this problem is currently the most pressing
onefor the United States.
The entire philosophy of at sea training has beem examined by the Ad Hoc Select Subcommittee.

Proposals have incl-

uded the use of commercial vessels for the five state academies
(Maine, Massachusetts, Texas, Californis and New York) which
currently operate Federally-owned training ships.

Since the

ships average age is 25-30 years old, the cost effectiveness
of maintaining these vessels has been queationed.

Procurement

of newer training ships has to be a consideration since the
state-operated ships are fast approaching the end of their
productive years.

The superintendents of these five colleges

are vehemently opposed to the use of commercial vessels for
cadet instruction.

Their feeling is that training aboard

today's commercial merchant vessels cannot approach that which
is achieved on a school ship supervised by a maritime academy.
On the school ship:
••• training is intensive in all phases••• can't do
that on a commercial ship: the cadet is an observer•••
the school ship program is attached to the academic
program; faculty is part of the ship's crew.4 1
This assessment of the situation is certainly valid; the academyoperated and manned vessel has many more intrinsic training
possibilities that the commercial vessel which has to maintain
a time critical schedule.

these vessels are operated on a slim

profit therefore cannot take the necessary time to train cadets
in such critical areas as engineering casualty control drills
in which engines must be stopped, electrical casualties which
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could possibly entail loss of ship's power, emergency shiphandling drills, etc.

Moreover, the superintendents claim

that their academies' underway training for six months is the
equivalent of one year of cadet training aboard a commercial
vessel.

Additionally, they queation the theory that increased

time at sea will result in a lessening of safety- related
accidents.

They maintain there is no proof of direct relat-

ionship between the two; that periodic refresher training
underway is more beneficial. 42 From this vantage point, it
appears that the state academies will have to increase their
at sea training time to about nine months and utilize the remaining three months in various types of equivalency training
such as simulators, small vessels and dockside training aboar.d
their ships.

Since the academies are very concerned about the

monetary impacts of greatly increased underway time, such as
fuel, crew costs, maintenance, tug services, and so forth, the
more equivalent instruction they can substitute for actual sea
time will curtail additional funding required from the State
or Federal government.

These fiscal problems associated with

the new requirements were referred to by the Maritime Administration:
A MARAD study, published in September 1979, predicted that increased annual vessel operating costs
for the State academies to meet the 12-month sea time requirements in 1981 dollars total 4.8 million if that time is spent
entirely at sea; but amount to between 2.1 and 2.9 million
if simulators are used.43
Simulators for Safety-Related Training
It appears that the increased use c'f simUlators will
supplement the USMMA and the State academies underway training
and should then be reported to IMCO by the Coast Guard as our
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interpretation of the equivalence article, together with the
number of days in which simulation will be used.

The advan-

tages of simulators besides the all important fuel and cost
savings include the reduced chances of accidents and concomi tant environmental damage ocurring and the unique opportunities for cadet training.

Realistic simUlators present the

student with the opportunity to perform on his own, to take
certain risks or attempt maneuvers without fear of the consequences if he should make a mistake.

The repetitive nature

of simulation allow students more opportunities to perform
than would be possible if only underway training were available.
?ossibly the major reason why simulators have not been
adapted for use at all our training facilities is the price
tag.

A full mission, highly sophisticated, shipboard bridge

simulator costs upward of five million dollars. 44

However,

the answer may be available; current technology can provide
less sophisticated bridge simulators for about four hundred
thousand dollars. 45

This type of simulator may be sufficient

to_fulfill -the needs of the state academies for cadet training
while more expensive, higher technology and more capable systems
either are currently in use or could be procured for more
advanced training needs.

Interestingly enough, if the use

of these simulators prevent just one major environmental
disaster, the price would be insignificant compared to the
real cost of a major tanker collision and subsequent pollution clean-up.
State-of-the-Art Simulation
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Two of the world's most sophisticated navigational simulators in use today are the MARAD Computer Aided Operations
Research Facility (CAORF) at Kings Point, NY, and the full
mission, day/night ship simulator at Marine Safety International (MSI) located in New York City.

These are not the

only simulators available for research and training but they
do represent state-of-the-art.

Other simulation training

facilities such as MEBA (engineering) and MITAGS (navigation
and cargo handling) have been mentioned.

CAORF and MSI

simulation operations differ in that the MARAD facility is
mainly directed at human factors research relating to vessel
safety while MSI, the only commercial facility of its kind
in the United States, provides a wide assortment of classroom
and simulation training for numerous shipping clients such
as Exxon Corporation and Texaco Incorporated.
CAORF was constructed in 1976 and has been utilized by
MARAD to research training and safety problems associated
with the navigation and shiphandling of merchant vessels.
CAORF can simulate any class of ship and any port.

Both day

and night simulation capability is available through the use
of computer generated imagery.

Corresponding radar video is

presented to the bridge team on actual shipboard equipment.
Closed-circuit television (CCTV) is utilized as a human factors
monitor to observe the bridge team under any of a variety of
navigational and piloting situations.

Safety-related problems

such as ship control and maneuverability, grounding and
collision avoidance strategies, analysis of piloting operations
in specific harbors, bridge system design addressing the most
viable procedures for team management and operating procedures
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and training methods for all potential watchstanders have
been studied at CAORF.46

Most recently, an enormously im-

portant research program aimed at the cost effectiveness of
simulator training for both entry-level and master/chief mate
personnel has been initiated at CAORF by the Coast Guard and
MARAD.

In a report of the project's findings to date entitled

Empirical Investigation of Simulator/Training System Characteristics, the authors discuss a goal of the project:
A major product of this research program will be
the development of training system acceptance
criteria for use by the U.S. Coast Guard in the
approval of simulator-based training programs for
meeting some licensing requirements. These will
constitute a major product of the current phase
of the investigation••• as well as ••• the likely
role of the ship bridge simulator in the deck
officer training and licensing process in the
near future.47

CAORF has assumed the leading role for future development
of simulator-based training programs for both initial qualification of merchant marine officers and continuing refresher
education available to experienced seafarers for recertification and general safety-related instruction.

Hammell and

Puglisi emphasize that simulator-based training has been
recognized in the U.S. in certain instances as a means of
certification and licensing for pilots in the Port of Valdez,
Alaska, and that the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978 calls
for setting standards for certification through utilization
of shore-based simulators. 48 The STCW Convention requirements
for lengthened at sea training have reinforced the need for
expansion of this training methodology.

An effective balance

is certainly what is required as emphasized in the project
evaluation:
The mix of elements and their characteristics

should be determined to achieve the necessary level
of training effectiveness at the minimum cost. It
is important to note that the simulator is but one
element of the training system. Effective training
could not be conducted on the basis of the simulator alone; rather, all the elements of the training system are necessary to achieve effective
training. Some of the training objectives are
likely to be best achieved via simulator-based
training while others may be best achieved via
classroom training, and still others may be best
achieved via at-sea training anq!or experience. 49
Marine' Sa'fety International (MSI), a private, commercial
shipboard simulation facility utilizes total ship control
training, cargo handling simulation mechanics and engine
room training together with classroom instruction geared to
various industry and government clients.

The visual simulator

can present the characteristics of many different classes of
tankers and gas carrying vessels, combined with the ability
to simulate the actual handling characteristics of these
vessels in any sea state, current or wind' condition. Maneuvering in pilot waters provides the training and watchkeeping
skills required for effective and safe shiphandling.

Class-

room training curricula is designed in compliance with requisite company needs, i.e., length of training courses, initial
level of expertise and instructional objectives.

Besides

employing a number of qUalified master mariners and engineers,
MSI also utilizes the services of "nautical assistants",
equally well-trained and highly skilled professionals who
are still employed in seagoing merchant ship officer billets
and are currently between voyages.

The presence of these

personnel as classroom and shiphandling instructors certainly
adds credibility to the MSI program.

The economic livlihood

of a facility such as MSI is based again on the inherent
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assimilation between safety and effective training.
For all the automation and electronic wizardry of
today's ship, the ultimate responsi~lity for
their safe operation lies with the officers and
crews who man them. The human element is still
key. The MSI training approach, therefore, emphasizes making critical decisions while under severe
stress and in confusing situations••• intensive
50
practice for what might happen in the real world.
Realistic simulator training is the keynote at MSI.

All types

of visibility and real world audio can be achieved and docking
can be performed using bow thrusters and/or tugs.

An important

addition for industry today is the LNG cargo handling simulator
which provides the cargo officer with "hands on" realistic
decision-making.

Cargo, ballast control, gas detection and

custody transfer systems and a loading and stress calculation
computer are available.

As is the case with all simulation,

many casualities can be practiced and observed by instructors
and trainees through one-way glass in the LNG, engineering and
ship control simulators which would be precluded aboard ship
due to safety problems and economic constraints.

Restricted

visibility training is accomplished utilizing all current
high technology radar, collision avoidance, navigation aids,
VHF communications and Vessel Traffic Services (VTS).

Train-

engineers at all certification levels is accomplished utilizing an' engine room simulation of a steam powered propulsion
system.

Realism is afforded through use of actual engine
room sounds and heat. 5 1
The benefits clalternative training methods such as
simulation to provide ttequivalencyl1 experience appears to be
a methodology whose time has come.

Another company which has

been a recent leader in efforts to develop more high technol-
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ogy and less expensive simulation equipment is Ship Analytics
of Stonington, CT.

After extensive research into training

programs utilizing simulation equipment, the company feels
the integration of seagoing experience with shore-based
simulation training is the most viable method.

The develop-

ment of shiphandling expertise, according to a Ship Analytics'
spokesman:is thus achieved:
Training, if
at isolation
skills. The
be exerci~~d
retained.'

it is to be effective, must be aimed
and development of those (shiphandling)
skills, once acquired, must in turn,
periodically if they are to be

It is clear that all these necessary skills, including emergency shiphandling training cannot be gained from at sea experience alone.

The President of Ship Analytics has succinctly

stated why this is so:
••• there are two basic reasons•••• First, it is
impractical, if not dangerous, in normal ship
operations to expose a trainee to situations that
are conducive to development of many shiphandling
skills. Second, even if the trainee were permitted
to manoeuver the vessel under these conditions,
there is no way for him to evaluate his performance and no way to duplicate the situation so that
he can correct his mistakes thereby improving his
performance. 53
With the recent promulgation of the STCW· Convention and the
desire to improve our nation's maritime training, the use of
shore-based simUlators appears to be one of the best methods
to both quantitatively and qualitatively measure the standards
we establish for our merchant marine.

Combined with underway

training, simulators will give us both cost effective instruction and the necessary general operating and emergency response training to further upgrade entry-level and continuing
maritime education.
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The Total

Trai~ng

Concept

In stressing a total safety-related program consisting
of shore-based and at sea periods, two further methods can
be adopted to increase tanker safety.

The first is the well-

established concept of passage planning incorporating all
aspects of sound bridge management.

The second concept is

a viable, workable shipboard training package which can be
implemented aboard ship during each voyage.

Both of these

training efforts will invariably lead to an improvement in
knowledge and professionalism for all hands, increased safety
awareness and ability to react in emergency situations, thereby
enhancing the safety record of U.S. flag vessels.

These con-

cepts are particularly important for a nation with a highly
regulated merchant marine such as the United States.

With

much emphasis on the increased use of technological improvements, redundancy of navigational systems and emergency
equipment, and the overall excellent training facilities available,both government and industry efforts should focus on the
human aspect.

In a paper presented at the International Tanker

Safety Conference (INTASAFCON

4), a member of the Operational

Services Division of Shell Marine International, stressed
this necessity:
Looking more closely at the records for Shell ships
leads to one clear conclusion. That is that accidents in a well managed fleet are rarely due to
equipment failure, but most often are due to faulty
operations, or what is frequently termed human error.
Within that category, we find that it is rare that
the erring individual had inadequate knowledge;
indeed most were well-trained had good records and
were strongly motivated. More often, the inability
of an individual to recognize his own fallibility,
or the inherent hazards of a situation, led to a
cumulative series of minor faults or errors,
CUlminating in a accident. 54
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AIthough individual and bridge team training is enhanced
through the maximum use of simulators and at sea experience,
it is of tantamount importance that individual U.S. flag
ship owners place emphasis on the necessity for extensive
voyage planning.

The rationale for formulation of a voyage

plan which documents all required shipboard manning procedures, navigational duties and system double checks is aptly
presented in a paper on the subject of Bridge Management
Training presented at the International Symposium on Ship
Operations in September, 1980.

In analyzing the problems and

interrelationships of ship accidents and human error, the
authors point out that:

6. Each accident is the culmination of a series of

events often small in themselves and often a matter
of coincidence rather than cause-and-effect.
7. In this chain of events human error plays a
large part; peuple make mistakes, and they overlook
warning signs.
8. People are reluctant to recognise their own
fallibility.
9. Whilst bridge organisation and procedures are
quite adequate when all is in order, there is
usually inadequate guidance on the use of procedures to minimize risk of "one man -errors", particularly with respect to monitoring the ship's
track and reacting to emergency situations.
These analyses lead to the conclusion that there
are two types of human error:
a. incompetent failure, when a man is performing
a task for which he did not have sufficient personal skill, and
b. competent failure, when a man fails to perform to his usual standard.
Of the two, evidence suggests the latter is the
more insidious, for it can seemingly occur without
warning on any ship in any situation, particularly
in times of stress. It follows that training in
personal· skills, though essential, cannot in itself
resolve the unavoidable problem of the fallibility
of the individual.~5
The necessity to combat this sort of failure lies in the
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establishment of sound passage planning from the port of
departure to ship's arrival.

The planning method based on.the

concept taught in British maritime academies, consisting of a
four phase approach to ship operation's management appears
sound.

The system consists of appraisal of navigational

factors which will affect a specific voyage, complete contingency plans for the entire track with alternative choices if
the meteQTWDgical situation dictates rerouting, execution of
the voyage with individual watchstanding responsibilities specified and understood by means of a set of promulgated regulations/duties in a shipboard document, and most importantly,
a system of continued monitoring and checking navigational
data and ship's course, especially in pilot waters.

The

relationship of 'the master to the pilot and the need for positive observation of the pilot by competent personnel at all
times must be stressed.

Essential in this entire philosophy

of sound bridge management is the need for checks and double
checks of individual bridge duties by team members qualified
in navigation and bridge watchstanding. 56 Monitoring of radars,
collision avoidance equipment, all electronic navigation
apparatus and course plotting will assure the reduction of
possible human misjudgments.
One aspect of tanker training which must not be overlooked is that which can be accomplished during the duration
of each voyage.

With turnover of personnel, there is increas-

ing liklihood that a number of individuals may not be totally
(or even remotely) familiar with pertinent emergency equipment
and shipboard design of the vessel class on which they are
employed.

Additionally, the possible environmental disasters

which could result from a lack of systems knowledge of tanker
vessels demands that a continuing training symposium, however
relaxed, be conducted.

It is the responsibility of the indiv-

idual ship owner or corporation to make this a matter of
policy by appointing a training officer or committee which
can plan activities for the duration of the voyage.

A ship-

board training officer, preferably the chief mate, should
supervise this activity underway.

The shore establishment

can assist not only in the planning stages but by providing
ship class films, videotapes or cassettes for enroute viewing.
SUbject matter should involve vessel emergency and damage control drills, pollution control devices and emergency medical
training.

This training can be further supplemented at sea

with regularly scheduled drills to ensure all hands are aware
of assignments in case of an emergency and to reduce reaction
time in the event an incident occurs.

Such rehearsals often

lead to an actual reduction in intensity of a disastrous situation either through increased reaction time when emergencies
occur or by providing the requisite training to altogether
prevent an accident.
Total safety awareness and crew emergency training can
best be formulated underway via use of actual equipment during
simulated emergency exercises in appropriate shipboard spaces.
This method is favored in lieu of the strict lecture or classroom training scenario as it adds the reqUired realism to the
situation and is much less boring.
In an article covering Tank Vessel Training, some current
examples of the overall lack of tanker training are cited:
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You may certainly rest assured that there are
Second Engineers at sea today who have had no
previous tanker experience and who haven't even
received the most fundamental training in tanker
operations. You can believe it, that in tankers
at se~right now, there are officers who have
never done a fire fighting course, never worn a
breathing set and who have only the vaguest idea
of how to conduct a search and rescue procedure. 57
In critiquing certain types of officer and crew training
sessions aboard tankers, O'Sullivan lists specific attributes
that make for interesting, practical voyage training:
a) The logic of limited time was excellent.
b) Visual aids-the equipment itself.
c) Audience participation-the equipment was handled
and used during the presentation.
d) All levels of experience were given several days
to prepare their presentation. Keeping them busy
doing things for themselves is a tremendous source
of 1 earning.
e)Everyone was given the opportunity to gain experience and practice in presentation techniques.~~
Thus the importance of underway training for our tanker personnel is well-founded.

Besides providing for orthodox

casualty control and emergency procedural drills; on-the-job
training and all exercises which further knowledge regarding
the tanker vessel can only aid in reducing the possibility
of incompetent failure by seafaring personnel.
Summary and Conclusions
The technological innovation associated with current
tanker transportation must be complemented by an associated
upgrading of our training programs and philosophies.

Rapid

growth in size of vessels and increased regularity of cargo
movements, such as oil, chemicals and liquified natural gas
aboard specialized tanker vessels demand a critical appraisal
of the state of our crew training if major environmental
disasters are to be prevented.
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Stricter safety and ship

design regulations associated with the MARPOL

'78 and SOLAS

'78 Protocols and the Port and Tanker Safety Act will undoubtedly foster more reliable transport of crude oil and hazardous
chemicals.

It is likely that the STCW Convention will receive

the necessary ratification late this year and be implemented
sometime during the latter part of 1982.
MARAD

The Coast Guard and

must continue research into the use of simulator-based

training to count as

'I equi val ency"

time fo rat sea experi enc e

in accordance with new Convention procedures.

It is recom-

mended that three months of bridge simulation training be
utilized as "equivalency" time for purposes of United States'
certification of deck officers.

An additional month should

be credited for small boat training and pierside training
conducted aboard academies' training vessels.

This recom-

mendation will allow maximum flexibility for the state maritime
academies, which currently train prospective deck officers
sea .for-six months.

at~

It will cause an increase of only eight

weeks underway time per student spaced over the four year
curriculum.

The USMMA, which currently trains at sea for near-

ly ten months of its four program will be unaffected by further
underway requirements and could devote the remaining two months
to a combination of simulator training at CAORF, Kings Point,
and small boat training.

The Coast Guard and MARAD should

strongly consider submitting these "equivalency" arrangements
to the Secretary-General of IMCO pursuant to Article IX of
the Oonvention when the STCW instrument is ratified by the
Senate.

This shoulda1l.il.o.w :the. academia's'

:su~ffitiJent~tim;e:-·to/

ensure

a smooth tr.ansition from current practice to formation of new
curricula while devising monetary strategies in consonance
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with MARAD and State governments (where necessary) to pursue
increased training requirements.
Finally, the shipping industry will need to revitalize
its training programs in view of the increased size of its
tankers, high technology systems manning and operational
requirements together with the concomitant need to survive
economically.

With worldwide pressure to reduce the size of

crews while at the same time satisfying the maritime unions
in the United States, the need for more specialized, safetyrelated training of our personnel must not be understated•.
In a Safety at Sea editorial, today's training dichotomy is
aptly set forth:
crew quality and ship sophistication have a complex
relativity which is obvious; the cheapest crews
are frequently at a loss to comprehend and thus
effectively utilize advanced designs and sophistication to its best advantage, and it follows that
for modern tonnage a very small, but nevertheless
a high quality crew with a strong common language
facility throughout, is the way that things will
go ••• to compete today, costs have to be minimized
and the temptation is to follow the pattern set
by others by reducing the crew••• with advances in
technology comes the requirement for a higher
quali ty for the reduced crew-and evolution to all
purpose officers and ratings•••• Crew levels must
be taken out of the commercial argument and placed
in the context of safety where they really belong. 59
Ultimately, after basic training has been received and personnel are serving at sea, it will be industry initiatives
that provide necessary refresher training utilizing

sim~lators

and a continuity of safety instruction aboard ship during the
voyage.

International Conventions and Coast Guard regulations

willserve as guidelines; but for actual training of the human
element, there will be no international board issuing plans
and directives.

If the human safety factor is to be thoroughly
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emphasized, it must be via germination of independent
industry training methodology geared to satisfy, and
ultimately surpass, international
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and

national directives.
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